I conducted a static analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, utilizing version 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The goal was to determine possible security and privacy problems.

I've written about DeepSeek formerly here.

Additional security and privacy issues about DeepSeek have been raised.

See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone version of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based simply on fixed analysis. This indicates that while the code exists within the app, there is no definitive evidence that all of it is performed in practice. Nonetheless, the presence of such code warrants scrutiny, particularly provided the growing concerns around data personal privacy, monitoring, the prospective misuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage characteristics between global powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct information to external servers, raising concerns about user activity tracking, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure determines these in the iPhone app yesterday also.

• Bespoke file encryption and information obfuscation methods are present, with indicators that they could be utilized to exfiltrate user details.
• The app contains hard-coded public keys, instead of depending on the user gadget's chain of trust.
• UI interaction tracking captures detailed user behavior without clear permission. - WebView adjustment is present, which might enable the app to gain access to private external browser data when links are opened. More details about WebView controls is here
  
  Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
  
  A considerable portion of the examined code appears to concentrate on gathering device-specific details, which can be used for tracking and fingerprinting.
  
  - The app collects numerous unique gadget identifiers, including UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and provider details.
• System properties, set up plans, and root detection systems recommend possible anti-tampering steps. E.g. probes for biolink.palcurr.com the existence of Magisk, a tool that personal privacy supporters and security scientists utilize to root their Android gadgets. - Geolocation and network profiling exist, indicating prospective tracking abilities and making it possible for or disabling of fingerprinting regimes by area. - Hardcoded gadget model lists suggest the application might behave in a different way depending on the detected hardware. - Multiple vendor-specific services are utilized to draw out additional gadget details. E.g. if it can not determine the device through standard Android SIM lookup (since consent was not given), it attempts maker particular extensions to access the very same details.
  
  Potential Malware-Like Behavior
  
  While no definitive conclusions can be drawn without vibrant analysis, a number of observed habits line up with known spyware and malware patterns:
  
  - The app uses reflection and UI overlays, which could facilitate unapproved screen capture or phishing attacks.
• SIM card details, identification numbers, and other device-specific data are aggregated for unknown functions.
• The app implements country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, suggesting possible security mechanisms.
• The app carries out calls to load Dex modules, where is filled from files with a.so extension at runtime.
• The.so submits themselves reverse and make additional calls to dlopen(), which can be used to fill additional.so files. This center is not typically examined by Google Play Protect and other fixed analysis services.
• The.so files can be implemented in native code, such as C++. The use of native code adds a layer of intricacy to the analysis procedure and obscures the full extent of the app's capabilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more quickly intensify benefits, possibly exploiting vulnerabilities within the operating system or device hardware.
  
  Remarks
  
  While data collection prevails in contemporary applications for debugging and enhancing user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises significant personal privacy concerns. The DeepSeek app requires users to visit with a legitimate email, which ought to currently offer adequate authentication. There is no valid factor for the app to aggressively gather and transfer special gadget identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system properties.
  
  The degree of tracking observed here exceeds common analytics practices, potentially enabling persistent user tracking and re-identification across devices. These behaviors, integrated with obfuscation techniques and network communication with third-party tracking services, necessitate a higher level of analysis from security scientists and users alike.
  
  The employment of runtime code packing along with the bundling of native code suggests that the app could enable the implementation and execution of unreviewed, remotely provided code. This is a major potential attack vector. No proof in this report exists that remotely released code execution is being done, links.gtanet.com.br just that the facility for this appears present.
  
  Additionally, the app's technique to spotting rooted gadgets appears extreme for an AI chatbot. Root detection is frequently justified in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and material defense are vital, forums.cgb.designknights.com or in competitive video games to prevent unfaithful. However, there is no clear rationale for genbecle.com such stringent procedures in an application of this nature, raising additional questions about its intent.
  
  Users and companies thinking about installing DeepSeek needs to know these possible threats. If this application is being utilized within an enterprise or government environment, bytes-the-dust.com additional vetting and security controls ought to be imposed before enabling its release on handled devices.
  
  Disclaimer: The analysis presented in this report is based on fixed code evaluation and does not imply that all identified functions are actively used. Further examination is needed for definitive conclusions.