I performed a static analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, using version 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The goal was to identify potential security and privacy concerns.

I've blogged about DeepSeek formerly here.

Additional security and personal privacy issues about DeepSeek have been raised.

See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone variation of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based simply on fixed analysis. This implies that while the code exists within the app, there is no conclusive evidence that all of it is carried out in practice. Nonetheless, the existence of such code warrants examination, especially provided the growing issues around data personal privacy, monitoring, the possible abuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage dynamics between global powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct data to external servers, raising concerns about user activity tracking, wiki-tb-service.com such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure determines these in the iPhone app yesterday too.

• Bespoke file encryption and data obfuscation methods are present, with indicators that they might be used to exfiltrate user details.
• The app contains hard-coded public secrets, instead of counting on the user gadget's chain of trust.
• UI interaction tracking captures detailed user habits without clear approval.
• WebView manipulation is present, which could permit the app to gain access to private external internet browser information when links are opened. More details about WebView adjustments is here
  
  Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
  
  A considerable part of the evaluated code appears to concentrate on gathering device-specific details, which can be utilized for tracking and fingerprinting.
  
  - The app collects numerous unique gadget identifiers, consisting of UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and carrier details.
• System residential or commercial properties, set up packages, and root detection systems recommend possible anti-tampering measures. E.g. probes for the presence of Magisk, a tool that personal privacy supporters and security scientists utilize to root their Android devices. - Geolocation and network profiling are present, indicating prospective tracking capabilities and enabling or disabling of fingerprinting programs by region.
• Hardcoded gadget design lists recommend the application may behave in a different way depending on the discovered hardware.
• Multiple vendor-specific services are used to extract additional gadget details. E.g. if it can not figure out the device through standard Android SIM lookup (since permission was not approved), it tries producer particular extensions to access the same details.
  
  Potential Malware-Like Behavior
  
  While no definitive conclusions can be drawn without dynamic analysis, a number of observed habits align with known spyware and malware patterns:
  
  - The app utilizes reflection and UI overlays, which might help with unauthorized screen capture or phishing attacks.
• SIM card details, identification numbers, and other device-specific data are aggregated for photorum.eclat-mauve.fr unidentified purposes.
• The app executes country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, recommending possible security mechanisms.
• The app implements calls to pack Dex modules, where extra code is packed from files with a.so extension at runtime.
• The.so files themselves turn around and make extra calls to dlopen(), which can be utilized to fill additional.so files. This facility is not usually inspected by Google Play Protect and other fixed analysis services.
• The.so files can be carried out in native code, such as C++. Making use of native code includes a layer of intricacy to the analysis procedure and obscures the full degree of the app's capabilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more easily intensify opportunities, possibly exploiting vulnerabilities within the os or gadget hardware.
  
  Remarks
  
  While data collection prevails in contemporary applications for debugging and improving user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises considerable privacy concerns. The DeepSeek app needs users to log in with a legitimate email, which ought to already provide adequate authentication. There is no legitimate factor for the app to aggressively collect and transmit special gadget identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system residential or commercial properties.
  
  The level of tracking observed here goes beyond typical analytics practices, possibly enabling consistent user tracking and re-identification across devices. These behaviors, combined with obfuscation strategies and network interaction with third-party tracking services, require a higher level of analysis from security scientists and users alike.
  
  The work of runtime code packing in addition to the bundling of native code suggests that the app might enable the implementation and execution of unreviewed, from another location provided code. This is a severe possible attack vector. No evidence in this report is presented that remotely deployed code execution is being done, just that the facility for this appears present.
  
  Additionally, the app's approach to identifying rooted devices appears extreme for an AI chatbot. Root detection is often warranted in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and material defense are crucial, or in games to avoid unfaithful. However, there is no clear rationale for such stringent procedures in an application of this nature, raising further questions about its intent.
  
  Users and companies thinking about installing DeepSeek needs to know these potential threats. If this application is being utilized within an enterprise or government environment, additional vetting and security controls should be enforced before permitting its release on managed devices.
  
  Disclaimer: The analysis provided in this report is based upon fixed code review and does not indicate that all identified functions are actively used. Further examination is required for definitive conclusions.